An unexpected contact on LinkedIn. An offer of employment from a recruiter, probably a young woman, operating from the Asian nation. The chance to make perhaps £20,000 on the side writing a handful of geopolitical analyses for a Chinese company peppered with confidential or privileged information. Payment in digital currency or physical money preferred.
It might appear obvious, on this telling, that an element about this approach would be amiss. Nevertheless, Beijing's powerful Ministry of State Security continues to view it worthwhile to use headhunters to try it – prompting the domestic spy agency to issue multiple warnings about their activity on the internet.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, MI5 chief the agency's director stated operatives from China were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a frequency of 10,000 over the previous 30-month period, attempting to obtain political, industrial, defense and scientific classified information. But a fresh initiative aimed at politicians and parliament has prompted the intelligence service to take further action.
A spying alert was issued on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economic experts, research organizations – anyone who might provide information.
Intelligence Approach and Legislative Updates
In the curious style of UK security services, there was no official release of the protective guidance from MI5 or the interior ministry. But the service knew its advisory document would become public once it was emailed out to Westminster. Sharing it in the press assists the general population more easily recognize interactions with a deceptive intent.
The alert has the impact of uncovering additional details from in and around parliament, although that is not the agency's main objective. The service aims for public figures to recognize that simply because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are completely safe.
Nor is internal security service understood to have been responding to any specific incident in parliament, although the burst of activity occur after the awkward collapse of the legal case of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his associate Christopher Berry on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been accused of working for the foreign power – a allegation they rejected – but failure to successfully conclude a prosecution under the since replaced Official Secrets Act led to concerns that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Revised Legislation and China's Strategic Goals
The law has now been changed, and the MI5 slide contains a reminder of its successor: “Those engaging in spying operations risk significant criminal penalties under the new security law.” This constitutes a crime if a person engages in conduct that could potentially “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural inquiry, though, is what Beijing has to gain. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have limited access of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs less so. But the Chinese government is also interested in parliament: for a time, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being driven by parliamentarians.
Cultural Variations and Persistent Digital Risks
To a degree there are distinct approaches too. Autocratic regimes like China’s export intelligence collection techniques and the size of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, employing 300,000 people. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, commented it was occasionally assessed that “China have more English speakers involved in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is willing to cultivate contacts over the extended period and sometimes even the agencies have struggled to differentiate genuine connections and spying. “Beijing has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value,” the minister responsible a government official told parliamentarians on this week, but a sudden turn in the government situation may mean someone quickly peripheral becomes significant.
An alternative perspective to think about the relentless activities at covert intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the west at a level below the level of outright war. The nation has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of communications systems in numerous nations, and the another operation breach of millions internet devices.
Beijing is engaged in relentless attempts to identify covert sources on UK politics via digital means because it seeks to be challenging, to demonstrate power and because it can.
